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CHAPTER THREE 
!VQTING AND REGISTRATION 
:"]'tiECHNOLOGY ISSUES: 
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: ·' -,_ .. - ~'. .·: - . 
'c; LESSO.NS FROM 2008 
.·t' ·{: :·;::: - ·- - .. 
CANDICE HOKE AND DAVID JEFFERSON 
After the 2000 presidential election exposed flawed technologies for vote recording 
and tabulation and for maintaining voter registration files, 1 Congress appropriated 
more than $3 billion in an effort to upgrade these systems nationwide, usually to 
state-of-the-art, computer-based equipment. The massive Help America Vote Act 
of 2002 (HAVA) 2 described the functional features the new technologies should 
attain3 but did not articulate or provide a process by which any mandatory feder<:J 
technical standards would issue. Nor did it require a compliance system for ensur-
ing that voting equipment and voter registration systems would satisfy the statutory 
standards. HAVA did require, however, a relatively rapid timetable for purchase and 
deployment of the new systems.4 Underlying this rapid move to computer-based 
voting and voter registration lay a critically unexamined assumption: technologies 
(such as automatic tellers and accounting software) used for many years in other 
industries could be quickly adapted by vendors to bring voting into the twenty-fir~.t 
century. Further, the Act reflected the prevailing congressional belief in the capacity 
of market forces to produce high-quality products at lower prices than a scheme of 
mandatory federal regulation. 
HAVA created a new federal election administrative agency, the U.S. Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC), 5 to disburse funds and to implement other sections 
of the Act that federally mandated new state efforts in election administration. 
Before HAVA, many states had left election administration within the domain of 
local officials, who had little state supervision or involvement. 6 Partly from displea-
sure with the Federal Election Commission's exercise of its regulatory authority, 7 
and partly in response to the traditional roles of state governments in conducting 
elections, Congress generally chose not to delegate to the EAC mandatory regulatory 
power over election administration. 8 Instead, Congress charged the EAC predomi-
nantly with the role of providing "guidance" via "best practices" and "voluntary" 
standards for state election officials. 9 
37 
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Given that by 2008, most local election offices had acquired at least two years' 
experience with their new voting technologies, some may have tacitly assumed that 
the voting technology issues of prior years would not resurface in the 2008 presi-
dential cycle. Vendors had previously dismissed technical malfunctions as attribut-
able to human error by poll workers, voters, or election officials,10 who presumably 
had learned from prior mistakes. The empirical record that has been generated dur-
ing the entire 2008 election cycle, however, documents a wide range of technical 
issues with voting systems, and to a somewhat lesser degree, with the statewide 
voter-registration databases. When the record is taken as a whole, and in conjunc-
tion with the comprehensive, independent scientific assessments, 11 the technical 
"incidents" that interfere with the conduct of an election are increasingly under-
stood to relate to the equipment's design, its engineering-manufacturing, and its 
documentation in operational manuals. The issues cannot be attributed simply to 
operator or human error. 
By mid-2007, the federal HAVA disbursements to states had totaled nearly 
$3 billion in four years. 12 In appropriating these funds, core congressional statu-
tory objectives included improving the voting experience, increasing accessibility 
for disabled voters, 13 augmenting voter confidence in the democratic process,14 and 
reducing the voting machine error rates from the 2 percent average of punch-card 
systems to a fraction of their former levels. 15 But achievement of each of these 
objectives appears more elusive as questions of the accuracy, reliability, and security 
of the current generation of voting systems and of the voter registration databases 
have become increasingly serious and scientifically documented. The apparent 
achievement of significantly reduced incidence of balloting errors,16 particularly 
"overvotes" and unintended "undervotes," is more questionable when the voting 
system's performance does not comply with scientific and engineering standards 
for assuring high accuracy, security, and reliability. 
This chapter reviews the 2008 election performance and scientific assessment 
records of the two major HAYA-promoted election technologies considered here, the 
voting systems themselves and, to a lesser extent, the statewide voter-registration 
databases, to delineate both their performance records and the statutory and regu-
latory apparatus that produced the technological shift. Perhaps surprisingly, HAVA's 
role in generating each of these election technologies is quite different. While HAVA 
mandated and constituted the originating impetus for most of the statewide voter-
registration database systems that were in use for the 2008 election cycle, and pro-
vided major financial incentives for the shift to computer-based voting, HAVA did 
not generate and was not the source for the regulatory and certification testing 
apparatus that approved voting systems for 2008 usage. Development and imple-
mentation of the HAYA-mandated voting system guidelines and its testing appara-
tus consumed significant time, effectively leaving iri place the prior standards and 
certifications under the Federal Election Commission.17 
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In searching for the reasons behind national deployment of voting and database 
technologies whose reliability, security, and other technical properties were profoundly 
deficient, at least four major reasons can be adduced. First, the HAVA-mandated reg-· 
ulatory activities were not sequenced properly for the best use of the federal monies. 
Second, the timetable for purchase and initial launch of the technologies was far_ too 
ambitious for developing voting equipment that would function at high standards 
of accuracy, security, and reliability. Third, HAVA dedicated far too little attention to 
the regulatory, managerial, and technological infrastructure at both the federal and 
state levels that was needed to support the dramatic systems shift, instead apparently 
assuming the market would satisfy the technical needs.18 Fourth, the Act's faith in 
the market to produce exemplary election equipment was misplaced, especially in 
light of the rapid pace of procurement and deployment the Act mandated. 
I. The 2008 Performance Record of Digital Voting Systems 
By 2008 most states had shifted a large proportion of their voters to electronic vot· 
ing systems, using HAVA funds for new procurements. The new computer-based 
equipment was designed to generate ballots, record votes, tabulate results, and pro-
duce reports of election results. 
A. THE SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENTS OF VOTING SYSTEMS 
HAVA funding that states used for replacing punch-card and lever systems could 
only be expended on voting systems that met minimum statutory criteria for func-
tionality.19 This set of restrictions led predominantly to purchases of three kind:; 
of systems: (a) optical scanners for reading paper ballots (both the portable, low 
capacity, precinct-based scanners and the high-speed, high-capacity, centralized 
scanners), (b) direct recording electronic (ORE) machines that usually feature a 
touch screen for selecting ballot choices (often conceptualized as an ATM-like vot-
ing device), and (c) computerized ballot-marking devices designed primarily for 
disability access. 20 If a jurisdiction selected paper ballots and scanning systems,21 
then a single technology would suffice for both absentee voting and precinct voting 
on Election Day, but precincts would also have to be supplied with ballot-marking 
devices to support the visually impaired. If a jurisdiction chose DRE devices for 
precinct balloting, the jurisdictions expected it to support both able-bodied and 
most disabled voters, as vendor marketing suggested.22 DRE deployment, however, 
necessitated some additional absentee-balloting technology. Most vendors provide 
software that helps design digital ballots for both optical scanning and display on 
DRE devices, and then later tabulates and reports the election totals from both 
technologies in one omnibus election results report. 
The vigorous debate over DRE accuracy, security, and reliability began in 2003 
with a report from several prominent computer scientists who are software security 
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experts. They reviewed the source code of a major DRE system (the Diebold TS) that 
was deployed statewide in both Georgia and Maryland, and also widely in other 
jurisdictions around the country, 23 identifying numerous serious deficiencies espe-
cially related to security. Computers that lack security protections appropriate for 
their particular application are vulnerable to attacks that can subvert their intended 
purpose, in this case accurate election results. Attacks on voting systems might 
render the machines inoperable, 24 or cause them to lose data, or compromise ballot 
secrecy, or systematically change vote totals in completely undetectable and uncor-
rectable ways. For this reason computer security experts conclude that security-
and mission-critical equipment such as voting systems require "high assurance," 
i.e., a convincing argument or proof, going beyond simple testing, that the system 
will always do what it is supposed to do and also never do what it is not supposed 
to do. 25 
Following the independent academic report, Maryland commissioned the first 
of several technical and risk assessments of the same electronic voting system, 
and other states also initiated voting systems studies of various types. By the 2006 
election cycle, at least six major studies had documented a broad range of serious 
security and reliability deficiencies in systems sold by various vendors. 26 Candidates 
for Secretary of State in California and Ohio campaigned in part on a promise to 
initiate closer examinations of their voting systems. In California, newly elected 
Secretary of State Debra Bowen began planning the independent study of voting 
systems used in the state immediately after taking office. The new Secretary of State 
in Ohio, Jennifer Brunner, issued an RFP for a separate study. 
Two distinguished computer scientist professors with expertise in both com-
puter security and voting systems led the California "Top to Bottom Review" 
(TTBR), which the University of California managed. As Secretary Bowen directed, 
the lead scientists convened four separate teams: software code assessment; "red 
team" /penetration assessments; documentation review, including of all testing lab 
reports and vendor manuals; and accessibility assessments. Despite receiving com-
mitments to participate in the TTBR from all four vendors of California-certified 
voting systems, only three (Sequoia, Diebold (now Premier), and Hart InterCivic) 
complied with the project's calendar sufficiently to be reviewed. ES&S did not meet 
the deadline. 
The TTBR reports documented a wide range of grave deficiencies in basic secu-
rity, reliability, accessibility, usability, documentation, and ballot secrecy design and 
implementation.27 In later reviews convened in California and also in the Ohio 
EVEREST risk assessment, 28 the reports documented a similar set of serious deficien-
cies in the ES&S voting systems using similar criteria. 29 Perhaps the area of greatest 
concern lay in security, as the vendors had not included high security among the 
core design criteria, or at least had not achieved it. If security considerations are not 
included at the design level, post-production corrections are rarely effective. 30 
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Some local election officials publicly criticized the voting system studies, argu-
ing that because the security vulnerabilities were identified in a controlled labora-
tory setting rather than as truly deployed with numerous procedural safeguards in 
a real election, the conclusions were invalid. 31 By contrast, other officials welcomed 
the assessments and suggested further efforts. 32 
In 2008, the vast majority of U.S. voters cast their ballots on voting systems 
designed and marketed by the same four vendors whose voting systems had been 
shown to be seriously deficient. The uneven performance of these voting systems in 
real elections was predictable in light of the constellation of technical issues that 
the published independent studies had documented. 
B. THE VOTING SYSTEMS' 2008 PERFORMANCE RECORD 
From the inception of the 2008 presidential election cycle, local jurisdictions expe-
rienced both apparent successes in using the HAVA-funded voting systems as well 
as notable calamities. A number of national and local advocacy organizations con-
cerned with election accuracy, often known as "election integrity" groups, assumed 
the role of citizen technology and security monitors . They communicated voting 
system technical problems to reporters, questioned election officials at public meet-
ings, and vigorously advocated for auditable voting technology. National research 
and advocacy nonprofit organizations that focus on technical issues produced major 
reports. 33 These national organizations, including Common Cause, the Verified Vot-
ing Foundation, and the Brennan Center for Justice, published major research and 
policy recommendations for managing voting technology issues. 34 
With government studies, independent academics, and major research organi-
zations having legitimized the previously dismissed concerns, and with the pressure 
for riveting stories from the campaign trail, the media became far more active in 
reporting voting system equipment problems. Because the technical problems were 
widespread throughout the election cycle, the following review is perforce illustra.-
tive rather than exhaustive. In January 2008, South Carolina set the course with 
malfunctioning DRE touch screens that caused hundreds of primary voters to have 
to vote on paper towels and other scraps of paper. Officials later identified the 
cause to be a date programming error that affected voters in two populous cour..-
ties . 35 Within the same month, several major Florida counties experienced signifi-
cant interruptions in voting, with reliability issues affecting equipment by the four 
vendors whose similar (but not identical) voting systems had been evaluated in 
the California TIBR study. Florida's technical issues included software bugs that 
impaired vote tabulation accuracy, DRE units that would not boot, memory card 
and DRE activator card errors, and ballot scanner malfunctions. 
On February 5, 2008, and succeeding days, the primary elections on Super Tue~;­
day36 produced a lengthy list of voting system equipment failures that impeded vot-
ing. Several Atlanta polling locations sustained long lines, and some voters departed 
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without voting because the DREs were not functioning. In New Jersey's primary, in 
some counties using Sequoia Advantage DREs without a voter verification system, 
election officials discovered a mysterious ballot-counting anomaly. After months 
of legal wrangling between citizen plaintiffs, the vendor, and the state government, 
a state court ordered a forensics assessment by computer security scientist Andrew 
Appel of Princeton University. His research team's October 2008 report concluded 
that software programming errors were responsible for the anomaly. The team 
also found that New Jersey's Sequoia Advantage DREs suffered from software and 
physical security deficiencies similar to those reported in earlier studies of DRE 
systems. 37 
In advance of the primary election, officials in Sacramento County, California, 
announced their plan not to use M100 ES&S precinct scanners owing to failures in 
their logic and accuracy tests. The county moved to a contingency plan, scanning 
all ballots in the central office. While California's voting technology produced a 
more positive track record than many other Super Tuesday states, a few counties 
reported problems with their central count scanners and with memory cards. 
Arizona's Cochise County suffered perhaps the most serious tabulation anom-
aly of Super Tuesday: 
(A]s the county accumulated totals from the precincts, a computer error kept add-
ing the results for five polling places every time new figures were added. The error 
got worse when the cumulative error went through five updates. County officials 
noticed the problem when they realized the total number of ballots cast was reported 
to be more than the people registered in the county. 38 
Because the total recorded votes were much higher than expected, election officials 
noticed and investigated the anomaly. When reporting irregularities are not suf-
ficiently dramatic to draw such attention, however, and routine auditing is not 
performed, software programming errors that can lead to erroneous election results 
are unlikely to be identified and corrected. Discovering grave errors by happen-
stance troubles many advocacy organizations, and they urge the federal Election 
Assistance Commission to gather and report software errors. 39 
·The 2008 general election reinforced the lessons of the primaries regarding the 
voting systems' uncertain reliability. Under the leadership of the Lawyers' Commit-
tee for Civil Rights Under Law, the Election Protection Coalition coordinated more 
than 100 organizations nationally to field legally trained election observers and 
troubleshooters. The Coalition established a hotline for voters, poll workers, and 
others to file reports on election difficulties. Partnering with the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation, the Coalition also sought to collect and analyze voting equipment 
problems. While the Coalition did not verify the individual reports and some may 
not be completely accurate, the constellations of voting system problems tend to 
match the press-reported technical issues that impeded voting. 
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Princeton researcher Joe Hall has analyzed the hotline equipment-related call 
data, finding that "machine breakdowns" led to long lines in numerous locations. 4') 
In one Atlanta polling place, all 15 DREs were nonfunctional. In other states, pre-
cinct ballot scanners failed. Long lines frequently ensued when primary balloting 
equipment failed, as voters declined to use the back-up balloting systems. Hall 
reports that voters distrust "contingency balloting" methods; across the nation, 
when the primary voting system failed, many voters chose to wait several hour; 
for equipment repairs rather than risk having their ballots omitted from the count. 
Voters also reported to the Coalition hotline that disability access voting equip-
ment was nonfunctional, that it had not been installed and activated when voter; 
arrived, or was not usable in a manner that allowed independent and private voting 
as required by HAVA.41 The hotline provided additional data that Hall characterizes 
as evincing "improper technical fixes" of voting equipment, such as removing vot-
ing machines to a parking lot for repairs while voting was occurring. 
Of roughly 1,900 voting equipment reports filed with the hotline, Hall found 
the most frequent was that the voting equipment was "broken" in some manner. 
These reports included nonfunctional lights, buttons, or legs; unstable screens, fail-
ure to boot, or crashing and freezing; failure to properly count or increment th~ 
number of ballots; DRE printer jams, DRE vote "flipping," and DRE nonrecording 
of write-in votes. 42 In the states permitting early in-person voting and increased 
absentee voting by mail, these innovations mitigated the Election Day demands on 
finicky equipment and likely rendered more voters able to cast ballots than if voting 
occurred on only one date. 
In the search for the reasons behind computer-based voting systems' problem-
atic performance record in 2008, the trail leads to regulatory decisions and gaps 
dating to almost 20 years ago. Unfortunately, at the inception of computers in 
voting systems, Congress did not perceive the substantial risks to voting rights that 
computers present and did not allocate regulatory authority sufficient to assure 
that only accurate and reliable voting machines would be used in federal electiom. 
As 2009 commences, the regulatory gap remains unredressed. 
II. The Voting Technology Regulatory Regimes: 
Pre-HAVA and HAVA 
Although the Constitution authorizes Congress to "make or alter" the states' rules 
concerning the "Times, Places, and Manner" of holding federal elections,43 Con-
gress has never delegated to any federal agency regulatory power that mandates 
state compliance with a set of federal minimum standards for voting equipment.'4 
Preceding the Help America Vote Act, Congress had impliedly vested in the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) some regulatory authority over technologies used in 
elections, but this was only to generate voluntary standards. 
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A. PRE-HAYA 
In 1975 the National Bureau of Standards, the predecessor agency to the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, issued a report concluding that computers 
could be effectively used as voting machines. But the report noted that its recom-
mendation was conditional. Only if there were "technical improvements of the 
machines" and "better management of the election process," as well as "formalized 
guidelines and greater computer expertise" so that election officials could make 
"informed purchasing decisions," could computers be responsibly integrated into 
voting.45 The study specifically noted gaps in information and design between the 
types of equipment that could be effectively deployed and the market power of 
officials to stimulate manufacture of the products needed.46 However, it did not 
acknowledge the extended gestation that would be required to develop a good com-
puter-based voting system because of the complex software that would need to be 
written and tested. Nor did the study adequately consider the likelihood or mecha-
nisms by which election officials could receive education in managing the risks of 
computer-based voting equipment. 
More than ten years later and after additional studies, the FEC's Office of Elec-
tion Administration finally began work to generate federal voting equipment stan-
dards. This effort eventually resulted in the first set of FEC voluntary standards that 
were published in 1990. Beginning with this first standards-setting effort, voting 
system vendors played a major role. Roy Saltman has noted that, perhaps owing 
to inadequate funding, the FEC did not utilize independent assessments external 
to the industry, but instead leaned heavily on the vendors for technical input.47 
This FEC dependence on vendors and its failure to involve, for instance, academic 
computer scientists, may have been a leading cause of the total omission of strong 
standards for security, voter, and ballot privacy, usability, documentation, configu-
ration management, and quality assurance and auditing systems. 48 This omission 
of independent computer scientists may have been the fateful wrong turn that led 
to over 15 years of computer-based voting technologies that failed to include, for 
instance, high security and reliability among the core design criteria. 
Nearly ten years later, after the obsolescence of the prior standards and the 
GAO's stern chastisement of the agency for its failure to update standards to stay 
abreast of technological developments, the FEC returned to the task of drafting 
voting system standards. Again, the agency omitted most academic and other inde-
pendent computer scientist expertise. The National Association of State Election 
Directors (NASED) collaborated with the FEC, eventually producing the two-
volume proposed voluntary standards. After a notice and comment period, followed 
by revisions, the FEC approved the 2002 Voting System Standards.49 
Under the FEC approach, and preserved by the EAC through its first years, 50 
NASED certified the laboratories that conducted voting system testing. The labs 
were known as ITAs or independent testing authorities. The FEC-NASED testing 
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procedures allowed vendors to contract with an !TA for "qualification" testing. >: 
The 2002 standards charged vendors to design and test their voting systems and to 
document all initial product and system development and internal corporate test-
ing. Once the vendor's own testing supported a conclusion that the voting systerr.. 
satisfied the 2002 FEC voluntary standards, the vendor contracted with !TA Wyle 
Laboratories, or later SysTest, to conduct the full system testing of hardware and 
firmware. 52 (The term "firmware" refers to software embedded in a voting system.) 
The testing procedures required the vendor to submit all documentation of internal 
testing and test results to the !TA in what came to be known as a Technical Oocu .. 
mentation Package, or TOP. The testing regime charged the testing laboratory to 
review the TOP and conduct system testing consistent with the FEC standards. If 
deficiencies were identified in testing, the !TA often would provide opportunities 
for the vendor to correct the problems. 
After a voting system's hardware received an !TA recommendation as qualified, 
the FEC required a software and documentation review by another laboratory that 
was specifically certified for this work. After the 2002 FEC standards were issued, 
CIBER Labs and SysTest held this !TA accreditation.53 
Each testing lab independently reported its testing results and recommenda·· 
tions to both NASEO and the vendor in a written report that was branded "propri·· 
etary" and thus highly confidential. Even a state's chief election officers and their 
internal certification processes often faced insurmountable obstacles to accessing 
the !TA testing reports. NASEO maintained a Voting System Committee that wa!; 
expected to undertake a close review of the ITA reports and recommendations, and 
to issue a NASEO number if the system had qualified as complying with the FEC 
2002 standards. As the GAO notably emphasized, though: 
No federal agency has been assigned responsibility for or assumed the role of test-
ing voting equipment against the federal standards. Instead, the National Asso-
ciation of State Election Directors, through its Voting Systems Committee, has 
assumed responsibility for implementing the federal voting equipment standards by 
accrediting independent test authorities, which in turn, test equipment against the 
standards. H 
Thus, in 2001 the GAO flagged the voting system testing regulatory gap for Con·-
gress's remedial consideration. The Help America Vote Act proved to be Congress' ~; 
response. 
B. HAVA'S AUTHORITY FOR FEDERAL VOTING SYSTEM 
STANDARDS AND TESTING 
HAYA articulates mandatory minimum standards for all voting systems used in 
federal elections from 2006 forward. 55 While the provision of some mandatory 
statutory standards is a step forward, the standards are predominantly functional 
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rather than technical. With one exception, HAVA left the voting system technical 
specifications a matter of state discretion. The Act requires, however, that all vot-
ing systems that states purchase using HAVA funding or that they deploy in federal 
elections after January 2006 include the following: 
• "Second-chance voting" or "notice voting," meaning the capacity to notify 
voters of any overvote ballot errors before their ballot is cast, and to provide 
an opportunity to correct the ballot; 
• At least one voting device per precinct that is accessible to disabled voters; 
• A manual audit capability; 
• Additional language accessibility, as per the Voting Rights Act, section 201; 
• Proof of accuracy in the form of an operational error rate that does not 
exceed the FEC's standard in 2002. 56 
HAVA also required states to define a valid vote for each type of authorized voting 
equipment. 57 
HAVA responded to the 2000 election issues by assigning to the newly created 
federal EAC various duties with respect to voting systems, including approval of new 
voluntary voting system guidelines, accreditation of testing laboratories (with NIST 
functioning as technical adviser), and certification, decertification, and recertifica-
tion of voting systems. 58 HAVA initiated explicit federal authority for these crucial 
activities. The Act also transferred the FEC informational clearinghouse duties to 
the EAC, including reports regarding voting systems performance. 59 
Neither HAVA nor any other federal Act compels states to deploy only those vot-
ing systems that have obtained either an EAC certification or a 2002 FEC-NASED 
qualification that would presumptively suggest the system satisfies the applicable fed-
eral technical standards. Nor does any federal Act require states to test for proof that 
their voting systems satisfy the HAVA statutory mandates for vote tally accuracy or 
disability access. Rather, compliance with the. federal technical standards for achiev-
ing security, reliability, and other objectives remains a matter of discretionary state 
governmental decision making, with those standards continuing to be typed "volun-
tary guidelines."60 HAVA's statutory standards for functional performance of voting 
systems are mandatory, yet HAVA failed to initiate a federal compliance program or 
to require states to craft their own. The 2008 performance of voting systems suggests 
HAVA's mandatory voting system standards were treated as merely hortatory. 
Turning to the impact of the voluntary technical standards and the EAC's new 
certification regime, the EAC's regulatory actions provide some basis for conclud-
ing that voting systems certified under its HAYA authority will reach somewhat 
higher technical standards for reliability, security, and accuracy. The EAC approved 
the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which became effective in Decem-
ber 2007. With NIST's technical assistance, the EAC adopted a substantially more 
exacting set of standards and accreditation reviews for Voting System Testing Labo-
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ratories, or VSTLs. 61 When NIST first evaluated the former ITAs-the labs that_ had 
approved the flawed voting systems widely deployed in 2008 and earlier years-for 
new certification as VSTLs, it recommended only one as an interim VSTL. 62 During 
most of 2008, the VSTLs were reviewing voting systems that vendors had submit-
ted for EAC certification pursuant to the 2QOS WSG standards. No voting system 
has yet been EAC-certified, however. Thus, the 2008 election cycle record does not 
reflect on the substantive adequacy of the EAC's WSG and its testing regime. 63 
The problematic voting systems deployed in the 2008 election cycle were permit-
ted under pre-HAVA testing rules, not authorized under the EAC and HAVA testing 
regime. Depending on the state voting system certification requirements and the 
state's use of HAVA monies, a state's voting systems deployed in 2008 (1) might 
have been required to satisfy the FEC-NASED 2002 standards and weak testing 
regime, as well as state certification requirements; (2) might have been required to 
satisfy the state's certification requirements and testing only; (3) might have been 
required to satisfy only the FEC-NASED qualification testing; or ( 4) might not have 
been required to satisfy any certification testing whatsoever. Although HAVA man·· 
dated that all voting systems purchased.by states and local jurisdictions with HAVA 
funding satisfy the statutory criteria, HAVA did not require that these systems pass 
any testing certifying that they comply with the statutory criteria before deploy--
ment in federal elections. 64 
In sum, while appearing to enunciate mandatory statutory standards for vot--
ing systems purchased with HAVA funding, HAVA was pervaded with regulatory 
gaps and vacuums that undermined its effectiveness in upgrading voting system 
performance. The first major error lay in disbursing HAVA's substantial voting sys--
terns funding before the EAC, its Technical Guidelines Development Committee, 
and NIST had completed their work to strengthen voting system standards and 
introduce meaningful, comprehensive certification lab testing. In 2006 and 2007, a 
series of independent assessments clarified the profoundly deficient lab testing that 
was performed by ITAs. 65 Acting on NIST's recommendation, the EAC declined to 
accredit CIBER as an approved interim VSTL. 66 By some estimates, CIBER had con--
ducted the lab testing of voting equipment on which over 65 percent of voters were 
casting their ballots in 2006. 67 
The California TTBR evaluations of vendor operator manuals and technical 
reports publicly confirmed the suspicions regarding CIBER's documentation and 
software evaluations.68 For instance, the CIBER evaluation of the Diebold GEMS 
tabulation software summarily concluded in only three short paragraphs that the 
GEMS software had satisfied scores of complex testing requirements, and did not 
include any descriptions of required software testing that the lab had conducted. 
CIBER presented in but one paragraph its platitudinous assessment of the adequacy 
of over 30 Diebold operational manuals in light of usability, accuracy, and the 
other FEC standards.69 The researchers concluded it was not possible to determine 
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whether CIBER had conducted any testing, or which tests it had conducted with 
what types of results. 70 
A second sequencing problem in HAVA facilitated the error discussed above. 
Congress specified an overly ambitious but mandatory timetable for purchase and 
initial launch of the new voting technologies, requiring that the systems be used no 
later than the first federal election in 2006.71 HAVA's enactment in late 2002, its 
specification of a new, more rigorous certification and testing regime to be insti-
tuted in relatively short order, and its $2 billion in expected one-time appropria-
tions for new voting technologies apparently invited vendors to engage in strategic 
behavior. Vendors' optimal strategy for the greatest market share with the fewest 
regulatory obstacles lay in pushing speedy sales to new HAVA-endowed jurisdic-
tions. 72 HAVA did not explicitly permit the EAC to withhold HAVA funding until 
a vendor could prove that its system satisfied the stricter performance standards, 
and the EAC determined that it would not interpret HAVA to require this proof.73 
Ultimately, HAVA's expedited timetable appeared to result in vendors making only 
slight adjustments to existing voting system product lines. Vendors then rolled out 
the equipment quickly for HAVA-funded purchases instead of designing, building, 
and testing higher-assurance voting equipment. 
HAVA's goal of improving voting systems was undermined by yet a third legis-
lative mistake: the Act dedicates too little attention to the regulatory, managerial, 
and technological infrastructure that is needed to support a dramatic technological 
systems shift and then maintain technological security and reliability. Consistent 
with its prevailing pro-market faith, the HAVA Congress apparently assumed the 
market would adequately satisfy the technical needs. 74 It seriously underestimated 
the risks to voting presented by computerized systems, and the infrastructural staff-
ing, education, and regulatory guidance that would be needed in a computer-based 
voting world. By indulging the traditional deference to state and local decision 
making in election administration, Congress inadvertently undermined the capac-
ity of local officials to conduct administratively competent and technically secure 
elections. HAVA provided lavish financial incentives for moving to technologically 
advanced voting equipment that generated new risks, but omitted the support that 
would educate and empower officials to protect voters and the fair administration 
of elections. The largely invisible risk to computerized elections-a matter beyond 
any cavil to the computer scientists who have studied the issues-was treated as a 
matter of marketing and conflicting opinion, rather than scientific judgment and 
effective public protection for fundamental voting rights. By this educational omis-
sion, HAVA exacerbated the conflict between sound science and election officials' 
discretionary management of election administration. 
As the 2008 election cycle drew to a close, neither the federal regulatory appa-
ratus nor most state governments had provided the technical expertise needed for 
ongoing local support of computer-based elections. HAVA started the ball rolling, 
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but then largely abandoned election officials; the officials were left to obtain ~ech­
nical information from vendors' marketing teams, which invariably promised that 
the voting systems would perform admirably. Instead of being penalized for fatally 
ambiguous or erroneous documentation, vendors have in effect been financially 
rewarded for their documentation failures. Electronic voting equipment has proved 
so complex and temperamental that even cash-strapped local jurisdictions have had 
little choice but to contract with the same vendors for additional expensive techni-
cal services contracts. 
In its effort to show respect to state governments' traditional powers over elec-
tions, Congress also failed to supply even interim guidance in effective and secure 
management of complex computer-based equipment, thus undermining the ability 
of state regulatory systems to protect election integrity and administrative compe-
tency. The elections policymaking and oversight apparatus lacked the requisite tech-
nical expertise to provide local officials with procurement and ongoing technical 
guidance that would ensure election integrity. · 
Finally, Congress's prevailing faith in the market to produce exemplary election 
equipment constituted the fourth major regulatory mistake. The voting equipment 
market's defects in 2002 and continuing into 2009 include substantial market 
concentration reaching oligopolistic levels; significant barriers to market entry; an 
artificial "market" composed exclusively of state and local governmental purchas-
ers; and regulatory mandates placing a premium on rapid procurement. Instead of 
stimulating vendors to design and manufacture outstanding voting systems, the 
statutory incentives favored vendors who brought their wares to market most rap-
idly. Trumpeted by glowingly positive marketing campaigns, both the software and 
hardware were heavily cloaked by stringent proprietary legal clauses that obstructed 
customers' close evaluations both before and after purchase. 75 A belief in an unreg-
ulated market's sufficiency is especially unwarranted where governmental enti-
ties are the sole buyers as this factor blocks normal market dynamics. Given the 
critical social and political importance of honest elections, and the indisputably 
defective market dynamics, the congressional gamble on trusting the market was 
unwarranted. 
Ill. The 2008 Record of Statewide Voter-Registration Databases 
All states but one (North Dakota) require voters to be registered in advance of vot-
ing. In the United States, voter registration systems are used to regulate access to 
voting. The government seeks to ensure that only those persons legally entitled to 
vote in a given jurisdiction are permitted to do so, and that each person votes only 
once in a given election. 76 Because voter registration lists determine who is allowed 
to vote, these lists constitute one point for potential wholesale disruption of elec-
tions for strategic gain. 77 
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In reviewing Florida's record in the 2000 presidential election as well as some 
other states' performance in voter registration record maintenance,78 HAVA's spon-
sors recognized that states had neglected to provide ongoing supervision and pro-
tection of voter registration lists. 79 Generally maintained at the county level, some 
voter lists were replete with errors that could cause voter disenfranchisement. The 
hypothesized causes ranged from local officials' inadvertent mismanagement to 
deliberate mischief for partisan gain. The HAVA Congress perceived the answer to 
these risks to lie in a statewide voter-registration database that the state's chief elec-
tion officer would manage. 
HAVA's core mandate provides for each state to implement "a single, uni-
form, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter-registration list 
defined, maintained, and administered at the state level that contains the name and 
registration information" 80 of the legally registered voters in the state. Additionally, 
the list must assign a "unique identifier" 81 to each of these legally registered voters. 
The Act elaborates a variety of additional design and operational requirements for 
the statewide database, including a requirement that its data be consistent with the 
Department of Motor Vehicles drivers' license database and with several other lists. 
It also specifies a range of technical managerial activities.82 
Creating a statewide voter-registration database is a complex technical task. It 
requires state officials to combine many county databases, which have been sepa-
rately developed and maintained, into one unified database. Further, a statewide 
database must include a unified update process. This task is exceedingly error prone 
for states with more than a handful of counties because the different databases are 
often built with different software, in most cases proprietary, or no software at all 
in cases where a jurisdiction still uses paper registration records. A large number 
of small but vital incompatibilities inevitably appear when data from two separate 
sources have to be unified. 
Voters' names alone provide many sources of error. One source might record 
a single field for the name of the voter as opposed to two fields for the first and 
last names, or middle initials vs. full middle names, or formal names ("James") vs. 
informal ("Jim"), or married vs. single names. There may be orthographic differ-
ences, where one data source includes Spanish accents, German umlauts, and other 
diacritics but another drops them. The problem becomes even more complex and 
fraught with error when states "clean" the unified database by attempting to purge 
it of duplicates, felons, or deceased persons. One such difference in data conven-
tions almost resulted in an apparently ethnically biased registration database purge 
in Florida in 2004, because the registration data recognized "Hispanic" as a racial 
category, whereas a list of felons being purged from it did not. 83 The problem was 
recognized and the purge was canceled. 
In mandating statewide voter-registration databases, Congress appears not to 
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and costly maintenance that would be imposed on states. Nor did it comprehend 
the risks the statutory requirement would present to registration data that consti ·· 
tutes the gateway to electoral participation. For instance, determining whether two 
data entries that have been recorded independently under different procedures and 
conventions refer to the same person is a notoriously error-prone task. Registration-
database purging based on matching of names and other nonunique data have 
been involved in the wrongful disenfranchisement of thousands of voters. The most 
notorious example remains the registration purges the Florida Division of Election:; 
ordered in 2000. 84 
As these database-updating problems have become more recognized, some states 
have begun to rely more on unique identifiers, such as driver's license numbers and 
social security numbers, rather than on exact name matching before deleting voters. 
Florida again provides a key example. In 2007, the Florida State Conference of the 
NAACP filed suit in federal court to strike down a provision of Florida's registra-
tion law that required the state to match the prospective voter's name and driver's 
license number or social security number on a voter registration application with 
the same information in OMV and Social Security databases. 85 The NAACP argued 
that the name-matching requirement would produce many erroneous matching 
failures because of the general problems with name matching. Further, the NAACP 
contended that additional erroneous match failures would result from innocent 
clerical mistakes made by voters in writing down the lengthy HAVA-required unique 
identifier numbers on the registration application or from numerous transcription 
errors made by state clerks in entering the data from those applications. The evi-
dence established that a high rate of county officials' transcription errors occurred 
that were no fault of the applicant. The case was largely resolved by Florida's statu-
tory reforms to correct some of the problems claimed in the suit.86 
While electronic voting systems have now received considerable scrutiny by inde-
pendent experts, the same cannot (yet) be said of statewide registration database~ .. 
As required by HAVA, states have been consolidating local registration databases 
into statewide registration databases along with procedures for their administra-
tion, but the indicators are that many states have undertaken these tasks with little 
or no consultation from qualified independent technical experts. A large number 
of accuracy, security, privacy, and data maintenance issues related to the initial 
construction of those databases and to their maintenance have been published in 
the popular press. 87 In many cases, state election agencies lack the staff expertise 
for handling them with the care requisite to protecting fundamental voting rights. 
Some state election agencies may also lack the technical expertise for identifying the 
appropriate set of advanced technical skills needed in advisers for such a demand-
ing database project, but no detailed federal guidance has issued from the EAC. 
All of the problems with registration databases that have arisen so far were 
eminently predictable given the technical demands HAVA specified, the lack cf 
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consistent software among the databases that must interrelate for consistent updat-
ing, and the lack of consistent data held in the databases. By contrast with the 
proprietary voting systems, state election agencies could resolve most if not all of 
the statewide database technical problems with the appropriate technical exper-
tise. Technical firms' overstatement of their qualifications and desire for ongoing 
service contracts can keep state agencies from procuring appropriately designed 
and updated statewide databases, instead leaving them with a patchwork of partial 
solutions and a steady stream of expensive contracts. Hence, independent experts 
who do not seek an ongoing services contract (similar to those convened for the 
TTBR study) might be a wise initial step. Of particular concern and presenting yet 
new technical demands is the relatively new idea of online voter registration, as 
permitted in Arizona and (soon) California. Another key concern and omission: 
thus far, no comprehensive independent technical studies have been convened and 
published that determine the statewide databases' security, accuracy, reliability, and 
compliance with federal voting rights laws. Deficiencies in any of these areas may 
seriously affect thousands of voters' franchise rights. 
As with voting systems, Congress's application of computer technology to voter 
registration reflected an idealistic vision of the opportunities the database tech -
nology offered, one that does not recognize or provide sufficient protection from 
the attendant risks. Unlike its treatment of voting systems, HAVA unfortunately 
omits explicit federal regulatory authority for minimum voluntary or mandatory 
technical standards by which the functional statutory objectives will be achieved. 
Instead, HAVA directs that the "appropriate State or local official shall provide 
adequate technological security measures to prevent the unauthorized access to 
the computerized list .. . . "88 In mandating a move to statewide voter-registration 
databases, Congress again sets many state officials adrift, making them vulner-
able to marketing ploys because they lacked the high level of technical expertise 
necessary to protect the voters' franchise rights and ensure the registration sys-
tems' basic functionality. 89 
Some advisory federal efforts have been initiated to raise state agencies' appre-
ciation of the security risks and technical challenges in managing statewide reg-
istration databases. In 2005, NIST convened a workshop titled "Threats to Voting 
Systems," which included discussion of threats embedded in statewide voter-
registration systems.90 The EAC also cosponsored workshops for state election 
officials, including with the National Academies, 91 on performance challenges 
underlying the required statewide databases. These efforts began only after the tech-
nological idealism had faded somewhat and the challenging reality that HAVA had 
imposed on state officials became palpable. 
Some published papers have shown that the technical challenges are not merely 
hypothetical. 92 In one major report, the authors noted the lack of agreement even 
on whether HAVA authorizes the EAC to articulate guidance or national consensus 
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standards that might be considered best practices for the statewide voter data-
bases.93 In their conclusion, they argue that three elements are missing from any 
definition of a successful implementation of a statewide voter-registration system 
under HAVA: 
1. A set of national consensus standards for voter registration systems. 
2. A set of consensus performance measures to determine the extent to which 
the systems exhibit the desirable characteristics. 
3. Means of obtaining the necessary information for those metrics. 
In 2007, the EAC commissioned a study of official voter information websites, 
which often include an online connection (interface) to the statewide voter-
registration database. The study report was submitted in late 200894 with recommen-
dations of a number of best practices that seek to protect the data and reliability of 
the voter information website. The study's researchers reviewed more than seventy 
websites to produce the assessments. In addition to finding some effective sites, thi: 
lead researcher commented that he was "surprised at the amount of information 
about registered voters some officials were putting bnline."95 Despite its classification 
as "public" information, he viewed some sites as creating the risk of identity theft. 96 
The study included a number of recommendations whose predicates reveal that 
many state agencies' statewide databases fail to satisfy basic precepts by which data 
security and privacy are achieved. For instance, the researchers advised that such 
websites "should be carefully constructed to avoid jeopardizing voters' privacy or 
the integrity and security of the records." 97 It also cautioned officials to be sure that 
any interface to the registration database on a website is, of course, to a copy of the 
database rather than the live original, so that there is no possibility of accidental or 
malicious modification of registration data through the Internet.98 The study rec-
ommended that state governments consider outsourcing the development of these 
websites, use commercial or open-source tools and software, plan to accommodate 
spikes in demand, and promote the sites' use. The researchers urged that HAVA sec-
tion 508 requirements be viewed as stating the minimum standards for accessibility 
and that administrators control and limit the amount of data exposed. 
Some states have experienced significant continuing problems with the HAVA-
mandated registration databases. In Wisconsin, for instance, 11 percent of voter5 
cannot currently be matched against other state lists. Its Government Account-
ability Board notes that this 11 percent reduces by half the mismatches found in 
August 2008, when 22 percent of voters' data entries were inconsistent as between 
databases. 99 The database mismatching spawned significant litigation in Ohio and 
Wisconsin during the 2008 general election, with some suggesting that mismatche5 
indicated voter fraud. 100 Unfortunately, the paucity of technological understanding 
regarding the design, reliability, security, and accuracy of these registration data-
bases may lead to an unwarranted public belief that fraud has occurred. 
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As the 2008 election cycle concluded, abundant indicators of serious techni-
cal deficiencies in the statewide voter-registration databases had arisen across the 
nation. No federal or independent study, however, appears to have been planned to 
assess the statewide registration databases' basic functionality or compliance with 
HAVA, as part of the EAC's research work or federal legislative agenda. The techni-
cal features and deficiencies of these mission-critical registration databases remain 
shrouded in secrecy. The federal agencies do not consider the databases within their 
core regulatory or advisory mandates; many state election agencies and their lead-
ership are apparently ignorant of the grave risks the substandard database designs 
pose and are reluctant to provide public transparency; and the technical issues can 
be daunting to policymakers at every governmental level. But this set of regula-
tory circumstances means there is no federal or other public accountability for the 
highly vulnerable public gateways into the electoral system and the concomitant 
rights of popular sovereignty.101 Further, neither voter registration database perfor-
mance metrics nor independent compliance reviews are currently planned to fulfill 
duties of election administrative transparency and accountability to the public.102 
The federal experience with the statewide voter-registration databases appears to 
track that of voting technologies. With both technologies, their inception has been 
marked by enthusiasm and idealism about the technological prospects, followed by 
serious and unexpected deficiencies in technical system performance or surprise 
from the fiscal issues that arise from the technology, followed by a more mature 
recognition of the prospects, risks, and costs attending the technology. Importantly, 
mature governmental judgment regarding voting systems has involved advice and 
reports from independent technical experts such as those from major academic 
institutions. As occurred with voting systems, critical evaluations by teams led by 
highly qualified academic technical experts may be needed in order to obtain "top 
to bottom" evaluations of the databases' technical sufficiency.103 These independent 
experts' involvement may be necessitated to diagnose, document, and recommend 
appropriate remedial technical steps and standards for safeguarding essential voting 
rights and achieving electoral administrative success untainted by financial inter-
ests in obtaining long-term consulting contracts. 
IV. Conclusion 
To a great extent and with the best of intentions, HAVA generated a vast national 
experiment with one of the most fundamental and vulnerable of our civil rights. 
While technical understanding may be improving at both the federal and state lev-
els, the sophisticated technical systems HAVA embraced pose threats to the fran-
chise. Before embarking on any new technological experiments in elections, the 
nation must revisit the elections IT regulatory structure. Computer-based election 
equipment should not be deployed bereft of a policy apparatus that is structured 
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and staffed so that it can remain fully informed of the dynamically developir:.g 
technological knowledge relevant to ensuring election accuracy, security, and other 
core objectives while also preserving voter access. 
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